



On the Term ekthmoroi or ekthmorioi

Henry Sidgwick

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that verse with *obelis* because I believe it has never been restored. I do not believe Euripides would have written οὐκ οἶσθ' ὃ τι ζῆς in the sense of 'you do not know what (blind) life you are leading' or 'that you have (but) the life of a mortal.' I think the word which I have in each version enclosed in parenthesis would be essential to the sense, yet it is not in the Greek. 'You do not know that you are a mere mortal' could be expressed in scores of ways. Mr. Page, who is a most skilful verse-writer, would not think of such an expression as οὐκ οἶσθ' ὃ τι ζῆς as a rendering of this sentiment. Why then should he ascribe it to Euripides? Still less do I believe that Euripides having written such an inelegant expression as οὐκ οἶσθ' ὃ τι ζῆς οὐθ' ὄστις εἶ

would have further encumbered the line with such a superfluous and clumsy *additamentum* as οὐδ' ὄρας, which adds nothing to the sense and brings in a most ungraceful οὐδ' between οὐκ and οὐθ'. Mr. Page complains that the verse is now 'buried beneath a heap of learned rubbish, the proper place for which is the dustbin.' Just so. That is why I obelized the verse and put all the suggestions for its restoration, none of which seemed quite satisfactory, into the dustbin, my note. The only difference between us is that Mr. Page would put his little armful into the text, not the note, into the casket which holds the precious jewels, not into the dustbin which stands beside it.

R. Y. TYRELL.

ON THE TERM *ἐκτημόροι* OR *ἐκτημόριοι*.

In Liddell and Scott's *Lexicon* the word *ἐκτημόριος* is interpreted thus—'of a sixth part: hence οἱ ἐκτημόριοι = τὸ ἕκτον τῶν γιγνομένων τελοῦντες, those who paid a sixth of the produce as rent, Plut. *Sol.* 13; also *ἐκτημόροι* Hesych.'

In the April number of this *Journal*, Mr. Wayte in a list of 'corrections of Liddell and Scott' proposed to correct this interpretation. His arguments were as follows:

'The text of *Ἀθ. Πολ.* ch. 2 (*pace* Dr. Sandys) supports the contention that the cultivators paid five-sixths of the produce and retained only one-sixth. This is also the common-sense view: if the proportions were reversed, it is difficult to see where the oppression came in.'

May I suggest that these are inadequate reasons for 'correcting' a statement of fact distinctly made by Plutarch, repeated—as Liddell and Scott indicate—by Hesychius, and indirectly supported—as I shall presently show—by Isocrates. Mr. Wayte's first argument I am unable to answer, because he does not say *how* the text of *Ἀθ. Πολ.* supports his interpretation. But it is easy to show how, in my opinion, it supports that of Liddell and Scott. The relevant phrases are these:—

...ἐκαλοῦντο πελάται καὶ ἐκτημόροι κατὰ ταύτην γὰρ τὴν μίσθωσιν εἰργάζοντο τῶν πλουσιῶν τοὺς ἀγρούς...καὶ εἰ μὴ τὰς μισθώσεις ἀποδίδοιεν, ἀγῶγμοι καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἐγίνοντο.

It seems to me (1) that the pronominal

reference in ταύτην to ἐκτημόροι implies clearly that the μίσθος or μίσθωσις was τὸ ἕκτον μέρος, while (2) the phrase εἰ μὴ τὰς μισθώσεις ἀποδίδοιεν shows that the μίσθωσις was paid and not received—was, as Dr. Sandys says, 'rent and not wages.'

The authority of the *Ἀθ. Πολ.* seems to me, therefore, entirely on the side of Plutarch and Liddell and Scott. But, says Mr. Wayte, the other interpretation is required by 'common sense,' because, if the πελάται only paid one-sixth, 'it is difficult to see where the oppression came in.' Surely it came in where our authorities describe it as coming in, viz. through a severe law of debt, administered by oligarchical judges independent of popular control. It is against this that Solon's remedies are directed: we are not told that he attempted to introduce 'fair rents.' If it be said that the law of debt could not have done so much harm, if the tenants had only paid one-sixth, the answer is that Solon's language indicates a wide-spread economic distress among proprietors as well as tenants; since his first boast is that he 'removed many mortgage-pillars.' Surely, if the economic difficulties of the small proprietors were so great as to require the revolutionary remedy of a σεισάχθεια, the distress of mere tenants might be sufficiently severe, even if they only paid a rent of one-sixth.

In any case I hardly think that 'common sense,' in so obscure a subject as the economic history of Attica before Solon,

should override the explicit statements of Plutarch, supported—as I have tried to show—by the natural and obvious interpretation of the words of 'Αθ. Πολ. ch. 2. I know of no unambiguous evidence on the other side: and it is to be noted (1) that neither Plutarch nor the author of the *Athenian Polity* give a hint of a conflict of tradition on this point; and further (2) that Plutarch's statement is supported by the account which Isocrates gives (*Areopag.* § 32) of the good old times,—describing how οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες did not neglect the poor, but ἐπήμυνον ταῖς ἐνδείαις, τοῖς μὲν γεωργίας ἐπὶ μετρίαις μισθώσσει παραδιδόντες κ.τ.λ. Now Isocrates, writing as *laudator temporis acti* is doubtless not a first-class

authority on a question of historic fact. Still the *Areopagiticus* is a serious political pamphlet: and, if it had been the established tradition in the time of Isocrates that the poor cultivators before Solon had to hand over five-sixths of their produce to their landlords, surely a writer of his repute would hardly have ventured on a moving description of the rich coming philanthropically to the succour of the poor by letting lands to them at 'moderate rents'!

On the whole, therefore, I venture to hope that—as the ancient authorities appear to be on their side—our old friends Liddell and Scott may be left uncorrected on this point.

HENRY SIDGWICK.

Δύναμις AND Φύσις IN PLATO.

We might classify the senses of the term δύναμις according as it is used in reference to (a) animate things, or (b) inanimate things. Under (a) we might roughly class its uses to denote personal 'powers' of either an internal or external character by subdividing into (1) outward might or influence (due to κτήματα and χρήματα and the like), (2) corporal strength, (3) psychical effectiveness.

Under the first of these heads may be grouped such passages as *Menex.* 240 D ἢ τῶν Περσῶν δύναμις ('force' as concrete rather than abstract), *Tim.* 24 E, 25 A, *Rep.* ii. 364 A, iv. 423 A, *Laws* iv. 706 B, etc. But neither this nor the second loose and vulgar usage deserves more than a mere mention.

Passing on to (b) we find δύναμις frequently applied (1) to denote the 'effectiveness,' or sphere of action, of arts or sciences, e.g. *Rep.* v. 453 E ἢ γενναία... ἢ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης, cp. *Gorg.* 447 C, 456 A, C. Also (2) it may denote the meaning or significance of a term, e.g. *Cratyl.* 394 B ἢ τοῦ ὀνόματος δύναμις, *ib.* 435 D, *Phil.* 24 C, etc. And further, (3) we find it applied as a technical term in mathematics, in the sense of (a) the side of a square or the root of a number, e.g. *Polit.* 266 B ἢ διάμετρος ἢ δυνάμει δίπους... ἢ γε τοῦ λοιποῦ γένους πάλιν ἐστὶ κατὰ δυνάμιν αὐτῆς ἡμετέρας δυνάμεως διάμετρος. Cp. *Theaet.* 148 B ff., and also conversely (b) of a square or square number, e.g. *Rep.* ix. 587 D κατὰ δὲ δυνάμιν καὶ τρίτην αὐξήν κ.τ.λ. ('by raising to the second and third powers'), *Theaet.* 147 E τὸν μὲν δυνά-

μενον (sc. ἀριθμὸν) ἴσον ἰσάκις γίνεσθαι τετράγωνον καὶ ἰσόπλευρον προσείπομεν. Hence the δύναμις, in mathematical sense, may be either τοῦ ποιῆν (square root) or τοῦ πάσχειν (square number): δύνασθαι, as active, has for passive δυναστεύεσθαι (cp. Adam, *Nuptial Number* p. 31).

It thus appears that the term δύναμις admits of a tolerably wide range of application. But Plato has taken care in some places to define this range with more precision. Thus in *Rep.* v. 477 C ff. he makes use of the term for the purpose of distinguishing between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα. First he describes δυνάμεις as γένος τι τῶν ὄντων αἷς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα ἃ δυνάμεθα καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ὃ τι περ ἂν δύνηται, οἷον λέγω ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοήν τῶν δυνάμεων εἶναι. Then he remarks that a δύναμις has no visible properties whereby to define it—δυνάμεως γὰρ ἐγὼ οὔτε τινα χρεῖαν ὄρω οὔτε σχῆμα οὔτε τι τῶν τοιούτων,—and consequently its character is determined by that of the *object* upon which it is exercised and the *effect* which it produces: δυνάμεως δ' εἰς ἐκείνο μόνον βλέπω, ἐφ' ᾧ τε ἔστι καὶ ὁ ἀπεργάζεται... καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τεταγμένην καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεργαζομένην τὴν αὐτὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ἑτέρῳ καὶ ἑτερον ἀπεργαζομένην ἄλλην. Then (477 E ff.) both ἐπιστήμη and δόξα are referred to δύναμις as their γένος or ἔδος, but distinguished from each other by their respective objects (ἐφ' οἷς), τὸ γνωστόν and τὸ δοξαστόν. So in 518 B, C ff. ἐπιστήμη is spoken of as δύναμις ἐνοῦσα κ.τ.λ. Hence we conclude:—ὄργανον: δύναμις: ὄμμα: ὄψις: τὸ λογιστικόν: