On the Term ekthmorioi or ekthmorioi

Henry Sidgwick

The Classical Review, Vol. 8, No. 7 (Jul., 1894), 296-297.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0009-840X%28189407%291%3A8%3A7%3C296%3AOTTEOE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2

The Classical Review is currently published by The Classical Association.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/classical.html.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
that verse with obeli because I believe it has never been restored. I do not believe Euripides would have written αὐκ ὥσις τι ὥσις in the sense of 'you do not know what (blind) life you are leading' or 'that you have (but) the life of a mortal.' I think the word which I have in each version enclosed in parenthesis would be essential to the sense, yet it is not in the Greek. 'You do not know that you are a mere mortal' could be expressed in sores of ways. Mr. Page, who is a most skilful verse-writer, would not think of such an expression as αὐκ ὥσις τι ὥσις as a rendering of this sentiment. Why then should he ascribe it to Euripides? Still less do I believe that Euripides having written such an inelegant expression as αὐκ ὥσις τι ὥσις ὥσις δέτοι would have further encumbered the line with such a superfluous and clumsy additamentum as αὐκ ὥσις, which adds nothing to the sense and brings in a most ungraceful αὐκ between αὐκ and αὐκ. Mr. Page complains that the verse is now 'buried beneath a heap of learned rubbish, the proper place for which is the dustbin.' Just so. That is why I obelised the verse and put all the suggestions for its restoration, none of which seemed quite satisfactory, into the dustbin, my note. The only difference between us is that Mr. Page would put his little armful into the text, not the note, into the casket which holds the precious jewels, not into the dustbin which stands beside it.

R. V. Tyrrell.
THE CLASSICAL REVIEW.

297

should override the explicit statements of Plutarch, supported—as I have tried to show—by the natural and obvious interpretation of the words of 'Ad. Pol. ch. 2. I know of no unambiguous evidence on the other side: and it is to be noted (1) that neither Plutarch nor the author of the Athenian Polity give a hint of a conflict of tradition on this point; and further (2) that Plutarch’s statement is supported by the account which Isocrates gives (Aesopag. § 23) of the good old times,—describing how of τὰς οὐναὶ ἔχοντες did not neglect the poor, but ἔφημον τὸι ἑδαικεῖον, τοῖς ἰδίοις δὲ προσέλθοντες κ.λ. Now Isocrates, writing as landholder temporis actis is doubtless not a first-class authority on a question of historic fact. Still the Aesopagiticos is a serious political pamphlet: and, if it had been the established tradition in the time of Isocrates that the poor cultivators before Solon had to hand over five-sixths of their produce to their landlords, surely a writer of his repute would hardly have ventured on a moving description of the rich coming philanthropically to the succour of the poor by letting lands to them at ‘moderate rents’!

On the whole, therefore, I venture to hope that—as the ancient authorities appear to be on their side—our old friends Liddell and Scott may be left uncorrected on this point.

HENRY SIDGEWICK.

Δύναμις AND Φύσις IN PLATO.

We might classify the senses of the term δύναμις according as it is used in reference to (a) animate things, or (b) inanimate things. Under (a) we might roughly class its uses to denote personal ‘powers’ of either an internal or external character by subdividing into (1) outward might or influence (due to κτήματα and γνώματα and the like), (2) corporal strength, (3) psychical effectiveness.

Under the first of these heads may be grouped such passages as Ἔνεκ. 240 D ἥ τῶν Ἴππων δύναμις (‘force’ as concrete rather than abstract), Τιμ. 24 E, 25 A, Ῥεπ. ii. 364 A, iv. 423 A, Ιάμες iv. 706 B, etc. But neither this nor the second loose and vulgar usage deserves more than a mere mention.

Passing on to (b) we find δύναμις frequently applied (1) to denote the ‘effectiveness,’ or sphere of action, of arts or sciences, e.g. Ῥεπ. v. 453 E ἡ γενεσις...ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντολογικῆς τέχνης, cp. Θυγγ. 447 C, 450 A, C. Also (2) it may denote the meaning or significance of a term, e.g. Κρατ. 394 B ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος δύναμις, Ῥεπ. 435 D, Φιλ. 24 C, etc. And further, (3) we find it applied as a technical term in mathematics, in the sense of (a) the side of a square or the root of a number, e.g. Πολλ. 256 B ἡ διαμέτρος ἢ δύναμις διψάτων...ἡ γε τοῦ λοιποῦ γένους πάλιν εστὶ κατὰ δύναμιν αὐτής τῆς ἑτέρας δύναμεως διαμέτρου. Οπ. Θεατ. 148 B ff., and also conversely (b) of a square or square number, e.g. Ῥεπ. ix. 387 D κατὰ δύναμις καὶ τρίτυν αὐτὴν κ.λ. (‘by raising to the second and third powers’), Θεατ. 147 E τὸν μὲν δύναμις,

K. II. I. VOL. VIII.