LIBERALISM, UTILITARIANISM, AND FANATICISM: 
R. M. HARE DEFENDED

Jan Narveson
University of Waterloo

The subject of fanaticism, brought up by Hare in *Freedom and Reason*\(^1\) in 1968 and often returned to by him since, has been thought a sore point for his theory by many critics. Two of the strongest critical treatments, by Alan Gettner and Robert Fullinwider, are found in a recent issue of this journal (*Ethics*, vol. 87 [January 1977]) and afford an opportunity to set matters straight. Both writers raise criticisms which importantly affect liberal ethical theory generally, so there is more at stake than setting the record straight on Hare’s moral philosophy. I shall discuss the two in turn.

Gettner’s thesis is that on Hare’s account of fanaticism, many quite ordinary and acceptable activities would have to be condemned as fanatical, Hare having focused only on the more extreme cases which we would indeed condemn. When we discern the error, we also see, in his view, that liberal ethics is inadequate and that a “messier” account of morality is required. I shall argue that Hare is indeed ambiguous, in his earlier treatment, but that Gettner in turn fails to see the basic point of Hare’s view, a point which is plausible and at least not refuted by Gettner’s criticism.

The fanatic is characterized by Hare as one who is willing to press his ideals “in disregard of the interests of others”; and, for this purpose, an “ideal” is “not based on utilitarian considerations but is something like an aesthetic preference” (p. 160).\(^2\) Gettner suggests that Hare’s description does indeed fit and does condemn the extreme examples which he tends to invoke as paradigms of fanaticism. But, he claims, it also fits many more cases which we would not so classify. In his view, “ideals play a far greater role in moral thought than Hare has seen and the clash of ideals and interests is far more common than he thinks” (p. 162). Gettner presumably does not think that Hare’s view requires that the clashing of interests and ideals is uncommon. Rather, he is presumably arguing that it is not unusual for the clash to take certain forms, and that when it takes these forms, it is often legitimate, whereas Hare’s theory would condemn them out of hand. Take people who think that drug use ought to

---

2. Page numbers in parentheses in text refer to the January 1977 issue of *Ethics*.

© 1978 by The University of Chicago. 0014-1704/78/8803-0006$00.95

250
be suppressed: a proponent of this view might well want his ideal to "override conflicting interests." And "we can expect that the advocates of these ideals will be quite willing to prescribe their universal application even to themselves." They thus count as fanatics on Hare's view, and yet are "decent folk" (p. 162); so Hare's view is inadequate.

The first question must be just what is meant by pursuing an ideal in "disregard" of opposing interests. Hare's writings do suggest a certain evolution of viewpoint on this over the years. On one interpretation of what he says, which we may call the strong version, it would be wrong to pursue an ideal if it conflicted to any degree with any interest: before pursuing an ideal, we would have to be sure that nobody's interests were at all negatively affected. And this, I think, is the notion that Gettner implicitly ascribes to Hare—with some justification, if we confine ourselves to his pronouncements in *Freedom and Reason*.

However, there is another and more reasonable interpretation, which is also more in keeping with the utilitarianism to which Hare has given increasing allegiance in recent years. On this view, ideals do not have zero weight against interests, but instead have some weight. How much? I suggest that it would be the weight which they have insofar as they themselves are interests. As such, the utilitarian view would have it that ideals go into the moral calculus along with more ordinary desires and interests. They certainly have less weight than their proponent is likely to ascribe to them, for he quite likely thinks of them as valid: he weights them, we might say, at face value. And since they purport to be supremely important, he therefore feels justified in overriding contrary interests—but note that he also feels justified in overriding contrary ideals, held by others. The utilitarian will give the ideals of both parties some weight, along with their and everyone else's other interests, and attempt to maximize over the lot as so weighted.

On the utilitarian interpretation, one who pursues his ideals in disregard of the interests of others is one who fails to give enough weight to those interests, rather than one who fails to give them absolute weight (how ever could he do that?).

Now, Gettner terms the dichotomy which Hare draws between "the liberal, who, when deciding on actions which affect others, considers only the interests involved, and the fanatic, who pursues an ideal regardless of the interests of those affected. The dichotomy is, however, a false one, failing to take account of an important intermediate position . . . that of those who are willing to pursue ideals at the expense of some but certainly not all interests" (p. 162). This position, he says, is "not incoherent" and probably "not uncommon." But this is to reject one wrong dichotomy by accepting another. Gettner plainly assumes that ideals are just ideals

3. The evidence from *Freedom and Reason* is, I think, inconclusive. However, in the more recent essay, "Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism" (in H. B. Acton, ed., *Contemporary British Philosophy, IV* [London, 1976]), Hare comes very close to recognizing just this interpretation, for there he observes that "ideals are a kind of desire or liking," and then notes that his doctrine means "that I am not allowed to take them into account qua author of the moral decision" (p. 121). Putting these two things together with the reminder that on Hare's view I am to weight my own desires equally with those of others, we get the result advocated here. I might add that in lectures presented at Waterloo and in Oxford in spring 1977, Hare explicitly adopted the present interpretation; he has also endorsed the formulation here upon reading an earlier draft. I am indebted to Professor Hare for this reading, along with much else.
and not in any way interests. But as we have seen, this is not so. Or rather, when we contrast ideals and interests, as we sometimes want to do, then we emphasize the difference between ideals and (other) interests and thus run the danger of overlooking the fact that a person pursuing ideals is, from the point of view of the rest of us who do not share his ideals, just another person pursuing his interests, interests which he is perfectly entitled to pursue up to some point, but which he is not entitled to pursue as if all the rest of us shared them. Ideals are, while they are at it, interests. And what the liberal theory, interpreted in the utilitarian way now advocated by Hare, says about them is that it is permissible to pursue them compatibly with the weight they have qua interests, but not in accordance with the far greater weight which their advocate might well be inclined to attach to them.

Now, it is a feature of utilitarian theories, by definition, that interests may override other interests, including interests of other persons, provided that no alternative available configuration would yield a higher net total of satisfaction. As we shall see in more detail when I consider Fullinwider’s views below, the amount and kind of overriding which may be legitimized on this theory is grossly overestimated by most current treatments; but nevertheless, we must agree that on the utilitarian theory, interests of others may be overridden sometimes. Therefore, the theory which emerges on the utilitarian view is an example of the “intermediate” position which Gettner supposed was proscribed by Hare’s theory. Given that people are interested enough in their ideals, the theory will allow the possibility that other interests with which they may clash may properly be to some degree overridden. The practical question is, To what degree?

But there is a theoretical issue of interest for those who wish to press Gettner’s view beyond its utilitarian interpretation. What, on the nonliberal conception which he thinks is required by the facts, would determine when ideals may override interests and when they may not? This surely is a question of the degree of something, since Gettner characterizes these “moderate idealists” as people who “may well give up pursuit of their ideals when shown that the sacrifice of human interests involved is greater than they suspected” (p. 163). It would seem that it is, as the liberal theory would have it, the degree of interests overridden that is decisive for the “moderate” view. The most reasonable account of why that is a matter of degree would be that something about the ideals in question is also a matter of degree, capable of being weighed against the relevant interests. On the liberal view, this something is the weight it has when viewed merely as another interest.

It is important that the utilitarian version of liberalism is just one version among others. The “libertarian” view, espoused by Nozick, is also a liberal view in the sense that, in effect, only interests matter, but it does not allow the weighting procedure which utilitarians must allow. On Nozick’s view, neither my ideals nor my interests may override either your ideals or your interests, if they are within your sphere of legitimate moral territory. But if we are trying to locate the view most consonant with generally accepted opinion, then the utilitarian view has rather the better of it, I believe. And insofar as Gettner’s alternative is construed nonliberally, then I believe it gives a better account than his as well.

To illustrate, consider the matter of drugs. Would we think that either an ordinary citizen or a dictator had the right to forcibly prevent someone from taking
a certain drug, just because his taking that drug "damaged" the suppressor's "ideal of society"? Certainly not. But most people do think that if an overwhelming majority of the population wished to make drug taking illegal, then that might be legitimate. Under pressure, I have found that most students are actually rather queasy about even that. Their first impulse is to accept the majority's right to make law, almost no matter what the reason. On second thought, though, they do not allow that just any reason will do. But they still think that if the majority was quite great, and the interests overridden quite small, then that would be OK. More to the point, it is agreed that those who have such ideals should be allowed to publicly advocate them in various ways, even though this inflicts a modest amount of inconvenience on others. Some overriding is allowed, but not very much, and certainly not just because the ideal being pursued is an ideal. It is only as an interest that it is allowed weight.

To take another example, when the mayor of Montreal strong-armed his grandiose Olympic building projects through city council, or circumvented that council, overriding the evident wishes of most of the citizens, he was universally agreed to be pursuing an "ideal," but this was not thought to justify his tactics. The trouble was that his ideal did not accord with what was thought to be the general interest and thus was regarded as just one person's interest against the great majority's. Because he pursued it against these interests, and in the face of financial disaster, he was widely considered something of a fanatic.

I conclude that Gettner has wrongly diagnosed the troubles with Hare's account of fanaticism with his coordinate endorsement of liberalism. His arguments do not show, at least, that the liberal view will not do, for that view, in the utilitarian version favored by Hare, gives a quite coherent account of the "middle position" on the subject which Gettner thinks is rejected by Hare.

Professor Fullinwider's criticisms are rather different and more complex and raise fundamental questions about ethical theory. A main contribution of his article, which deserves careful thought, is his division of Hare's universalizability requirement into three distinct tests. Test 1, which he calls the "reversibility" test, consists in asking whether one would be willing to have the proposed rule or principle in force if one were in the situation of those who would be adversely affected by it. Test 2 is like test 1 except that one asks not what one would think if one were in that position himself but rather what one would think if one were in that position with the desires and interests of those affected—which is equivalent to asking what their view of it is. Test 3, finally, is an impartiality test: it asks us, in effect, to assume the desires and interests of all concerned and then decide whether the policy under consideration would be chosen in the light of an impartial weighting of all the desires and interests in question. In each case, the policy or rule is to be rejected as immoral if it would not be chosen under the condition imposed. This is an important distinction, though there are still more interpretations of universalizability. But I believe that Fullinwider's most crucial criticisms of Hare in the light of the distinctions are defective in ways that are also crucial for ethical theory.

Fullinwider sees a big difference between tests 1 and 2, as follows: Test 1, he thinks, is indeed one of "consistency" and is, as Hare said it was, purely "formal." For that reason, it has the result that it cannot show the fanatic to be necessarily inconsistent, though he agrees that probably most of them would turn out to be so
on it. "If [the Nazi] prescribes death for all Jews, but hesitates to prescribe his own death were he to turn out to be one himself . . . his position is indefensibly inconsistent" (p. 166). As against test 2, on the other hand, he points out that that test requires the agent to assume different desires from the ones he actually has. For example, it requires him to adopt the desire that Jews not be exterminated, since that is a desire that Jews whose extermination he is contemplating actually have. But this, he believes, will lead to the test’s having no "instructive value for any decision about what he ought or ought not to do. To imagine oneself as not having a desire does not tell one whether it is permissible to act on that desire if one has it" (p. 166). The test is thus without practical significance, in his view.

Now there is indeed a difference between tests 1 and 2. But is it a difference that makes the kind of difference Fullinwider attributes to it, namely, all the difference between a genuine test of consistency in action and one with no practical force whatever? No. It is perfectly true that the second test requires us to act as if we had certain desires which we probably do not in fact have. But equally, the first test requires us to act as if we were in a situation which we probably are not in fact in. (Indeed, as of the moment of decision, we can delete the 'probably' in both cases.) Why, then, should the first test have the kind of practical force which a genuine consistency test presumably must have?

To take an example: Typically, when driving, I rely on my brakes. I drive quickly enough so that, if my brakes were suddenly to fail completely and without warning, I would most likely have a serious accident. One might suppose that an analogue of Hare’s test, if it were a consistency test in the sense in which Fullinwider evidently thinks it is, would go like this: (1) If my brakes were to fail, I would have a serious accident, which I do not want; therefore (2) I should never drive in such a way as to rely on my brakes. This, of course, would be silly. Nobody can be accused of "practical inconsistency" for failing to apply this test, though he could be accused of irrationality if he did. Plainly, the important question is whether my brakes are likely to fail. Given that I do not want to have an accident, and that a necessary condition for avoiding one if I drive at more than a snail’s pace is that my brakes be reliable, I am being practically consistent if I check frequently enough to assure myself that they are reliable. Similarly, then, why am I not being a practically consistent Nazi if, in acting so as to exterminate Jews, I have made quite sure that I am not one myself? The fact that if I did turn out to be one I would have severe second thoughts about the policy of extermination is hardly relevant so long as I have taken due precautions about the possibility.

Both tests 1 and 2, therefore, go beyond practical consistency, in the usual acceptance of that term. And Hare, I believe, is well aware of this. He does not claim that one who violates test 1 is being irrational or practically inconsistent, but only that he cannot consistently express the failed policy in terms of ‘ought’ (or, at least, of ‘morally ought’). What is in question is not sheer practical consistency, but moral consistency, that is to say, consistency with the minimal requirements of morality—or, if we like, of consistent usage of language which is recognizable moral language rather than something else.

Neither tests 1 and 2, nor of course test 3, will convict an agent of practical inconsistency as such, then—unless we can show that it is practically necessary to be
Discussion

moral or to employ moral language. Now, Hare has argued tentatively for the latter, and so, in a rather different way, have many moral philosophers such as Kant and Sidgwick. (So, for that matter, have I.) But there are different ways of doing this, and differences among the three tests will emerge from this, or might well. And all this will be relevant to the issue of fanaticism in particular, as well, as I shall now proceed to argue.

To begin with, let us appreciate the differences among the tests. Speaking somewhat speculatively vis-à-vis Hare's intellectual biography, I believe that these three tests are successive refinements of the root idea that morality is in some fundamental sense general or universal, which has always been one of Hare's main seminal ideas. These refinements cannot be simply summarized in terms of greater or lesser restrictiveness. Consider the first test. According to one understanding of it, as Bernard Shaw observed, it would be overly restrictive. For if I dislike having my back scratched, then since I would not like it if I were in your situation, it would be wrong for me to scratch your back, even if you enjoyed this immensely. On the other hand, though, the first test is not, as Hare saw, restrictive enough in another direction, for if I treat people in various situations as if they had my tastes and desires, this would allow me to do many things to them which they would strongly object to. We must, therefore, modify the idea so that it requires me to treat others in the light of their interests rather than my own (test 2). But then we meet up with a new problem. For as originally expressed, the tests seem to give everyone affected by an action a veto power over whether it should be done. If anyone objects in the least, then the crude formulation invoked in test 2 seems to declare that it is wrong. In order to fix this up, we seem to need two things. First, we need to consider only reasonable objections—objections to the policy or type of action under consideration which are prudentially reasonable from the point of view of the person affected rather than whimsical, arbitrary, or poorly supported by relevant facts. Second, and relevant to Hare's later utilitarian view, we need some way of adjudicating conflicts if they still occur, as they well might. Here is where the idea of utter utilitarian impartiality comes in. Agreeing that all that matters is the overall interests of all those affected, we select as our principle the one which simply maximizes over them on a person-indifferent basis. In effect, this moves us from the unsatisfactory idea of giving each party a veto, to the very different one of giving each party a vote, one which must be counted in determining what is to be done but is not necessarily individually decisive. Now a negative interest can be outweighed by a sum of advantages for others. So we have straight utilitarianism as the upshot.

It must be emphasized that the utilitarian type of refinement is by no means the only possible one. But the utilitarianism is an intriguingly extreme theory from the theoretical point of view, for it is at once a pure interest theory and a pure impartialist one. As the latter, it raises in acute form the question of why one should be impartial. Obviously one's own interests will not always coincide with the weighted sum of all affected interests, and it may clash with the latter in a very far-reaching way. If people are essentially self-interested, there will obviously be a problem of why they would, rationally, subscribe to utilitarianism. But the same

question will arise concerning the first two tests. Why should a being who is not in circumstances C act as though he were? Why should a being who does not have desire X act as though he did? Why, indeed?

If the answers to these questions must be derived from the concept of a rational being as one who maximizes his utilities, that is, who acts so as to do the best he can by his ensemble of desires, interests, ideals, then it is important to see that neither tests 1 nor 2 will be supported as they stand. The only reason I can have for acting as if I were in your situation, or had your desires, is that you are in a position to make me take them into account, namely, by affecting my utility. Perhaps I sympathize with all beings of my species, in which case you affect me by affecting my sympathetic responses when I envisage your situation. Or perhaps I sympathize with all rational beings of whatever stripe. Possibly we share some other interests. But perhaps we do not, and perhaps I lack all of the foregoing sympathies too. Then what? You might then threaten retaliation if I do not keep off your toes. In that case, my proper reaction is to see how probable it is that you can make good the threat and how much of a threat it is; then I compare the potential gains for me if I succeed with what I proposed to do, minus the potential losses if I do not, as compared with the net advantages of any other action open to me, and choose accordingly. Taking all these things into account, I then have the answer to the question. To what degree and in what ways should I take your situation and your interests into account? Tests 1 and 2 may be viewed as approximations to the restrictions on principles I would employ as a being forced to deal with other self-interested beings who, as free and rational, are able to select retaliatory strategies and who have various possible sympathetic appeals. But it would be absurd to suggest that I would, on this understanding of the foundations of morality, adopt the extreme restrictions involved in granting a veto to all affected beings. For that matter, there is no reason to suppose that my results will be the same no matter which particular set of fellow beings I am dealing with.

Neither will we get utilitarianism, though. It is true that if we go for anything else, then we also know that many will come out worse than they might have: for if, indeed, utilitarian maximization were achieved, then by definition the average expected utility will be highest as compared with any principle which was not extensionally equivalent. Now, this will give the self-interested person a reason to adopt utilitarianism, but only if he is in effect randomizing over his entry points into the system—for example, if he were choosing behind Rawls's veil of ignorance. And why should he assume that? For this again is to adopt impartiality for one's starting point, in effect.

The upshot of this is that if morality is essentially the set of restrictions which a rationally self-interested being would adopt as such, then none of the usual conceptions of morality will be fully supported. On the other hand, if there is a fundamental underlying requirement that we reason from the viewpoint of others, then

there is a powerful push in the direction of utilitarianism. It is the selection of the second option, plus appreciation of the latter implication, that explains Hare’s adoption of utilitarianism in recent years.

Let us now return to the fanatic. Fullinwider frequently reiterates the view that, in Hare’s phrase, it would be “scandalous” if a moral theory cannot deal with fanatics. But Hare’s admission that a fanatic could not be shown to have a logically unacceptable position on his view is taken by Fullinwider to show incapacity to deal with them. Similarly, he takes the fact that the utilitarian view would not show all fanatical behavior to be necessarily immoral as a fatal weakness in it. Why? Do we need to show that in order for our moral theory to be satisfactory?

In tackling this question, we might first reflect on the meaning of the word ‘necessarily’ for these purposes. In Hare’s earlier work, especially *Freedom and Reason*, he was concerned to show how some purported moralities could be ruled out as inconsistent. But apparently he has been taken to be claiming that all consistent moralities, by those tests, were correct, that is, that a test for consistency was also sufficient as a test for moral truth. Of course, Hare as a subjectivist rejects the notion of “truth” in these contexts. But this, as we now know, does not matter, for there is still a difference between my being rationally required to embrace a set of principles and my being rationally forced to admit that the person who does embrace them is at any rate not contradicting himself. And that is all Hare needs to retain the distinction in question. So the fanatical Nazi might be consistent, on Hare’s view—but this certainly does not mean that we have to endorse or share his position. So if Fullinwider’s complaint is that Hare’s moves in effect endorse or sanction fanaticism in some cases, then the short answer is that they do not and the complaint is misguided. But of course it does raise the question in what sense immoral people must be “assailable in argument.” Fullinwider says that “Hare needs to remove the fanatic from the scene altogether” (p. 168). But why? Much as we might like to remove him from the scene literally, must we also be able to obliterate him in argument as well? Do we require obliteration by self-contradiction? I should think not.

Let us suppose instead that what is called for is a theory which will strongly confirm our strongly held convictions, as recent philosophical method would have it. Among these, no doubt, is that genocide and Nazi-type racism are evil. If this is the requirement, then I suggest that utilitarianism does the job pretty well. If Fullinwider thinks otherwise, I suspect it is because of certain misunderstandings about utilitarianism, some of which are fostered, I fear, by Hare’s own handling of the issue. Let us see whether the record cannot be set straight.

Hare, as Fullinwider observes, argues that if the fanatic’s desire were intense enough, it could outweigh the contrary desires of all victims of the fanaticism in question and thus foster a duty for the conscientious utilitarian to side with the fanatic rather than his erstwhile victim(s). And given that we are thinking of fanatical Nazis, sadists, and the others of Hare’s paradigms, this of course is outrageous. (On the other hand, bearing in mind Gettner’s point, discussed at the outset, we must also agree that there could be fanatical chess players, stamp collectors, etc. whose cases might not bother so much.) But it is also outrageous as an application of utilitarian method. Utilitarianism, recall, declares that action to be right which maximally promotes the overall, long-term satisfaction/happiness/pleasure of all concerned among the
alternatives available to the agent. It declares, then, that that character, or set of long-term intentions, is morally the one to have which, among all alternative characters psychologically available to the agent, maximally promotes the overall long-term satisfaction, etc., of all concerned. If the agent contemplates an action which would obviously bring misery to anyone, let alone many people, then utilitarianism tells him to consider whether there are any alternatives by which he would on the whole do better; if he contemplates sequences of such actions, he should ask whether it is not possible for him to adopt some other disposition, perhaps with the aid of his psychiatrist, by which he would on the whole do better for all concerned. Now consider those desires which require for their satisfaction the frustration, injury, or misery of others. It is clear that if such desires are catered to, then it will be impossible for all to be happy. These are desires whose satisfaction would necessarily make the utilitarian ideal unattainable. It is plain that such desires must be viewed by the utilitarian moralist with the utmost suspicion. Under what circumstances will satisfying them be legitimate? Only when no other ensemble of desires is possible for the agent, such that altering his psychology in the direction of those desires would cost less, in terms of satisfaction, than the satisfaction gained by those potential victims who would otherwise suffer from ministering to his sadistic tendencies.

Obviously, utilitarianism always calls for estimates of cardinal interpersonal utilities, and obviously this is always, to put it mildly, difficult. But, as has often been pointed out in the literature, if cardinalization is impossible, then neither the opponents of utilitarianism, who claim that it gives the wrong results, nor its proponents, who claim that it gives the right ones, can get started in those claims. And Fullinwider, evidently, is among those who think that it gives the wrong ones rather than among those who think that it gives none at all. We must here use common sense as a guide, evidently. And it is not really sensible to suppose that the happiness (!) which Nazis get from being Nazis, as compared with what they could get from any nonsadistic way of life, outweighs the loss they inflict on people who are deprived of their lives, possessions, loved ones, and the pleasure from life they could have enjoyed were they not kept in hideous concentration camps. It would make some difference, but not enough to amount to a remotely plausible justification, if the sadists were many and their victims few. For that would only help much if the original arithmetic was right. That is, only if the sadist’s way of life could not be improved upon or equaled by substituting a nonsadistic way of life, do we even get to the subject of outweighing the costs imposed on others. It at least takes a “plus” to compensate a “minus,” and it is absurd to think that we even have one yet. (Indeed, is there not every reason to believe that the Nazis themselves were a wretched lot? Is there any reason to believe that they were living happy, satisfied lives?)

Of course, there is still the lingering doubt about the theory’s overall arithmetic. Let us therefore compare two interesting cases with the above. The first case has to do with attitudes toward the Divine Being. For what it’s worth, we might bear in mind that millions of people have believed, for ages, that this one being’s utilities were so vast that they justified the sacrifice of millions of mere mortals to promote (somehow) His eternal satisfactions. On a somewhat more down-to-earth scale, there is the matter of animals, whom we have long felt free to eat or enslave (but not to
wantonly beat) for our own pleasure. The ordinary attitude would seem to be that while this is a pity, still, things being what they are, the gain to us outweighs the loss to them. Nor is this merely silly.

Another and still more down-to-earth instance will perhaps fill in the picture still more conclusively. My point has been that if there are desires whose satisfaction requires the dissatisfaction of others, then the utilitarian must consider (a) the cost of changing them in such a way that the person in question no longer requires that these costs be imposed, and (b) the amount of dissatisfaction others must experience in order to satisfy the desires in question. If the costs of change are considerable and the amount of dissatisfaction involved small in comparison with the satisfaction gained by the persons in question, it then asks us to put up with it. Is this agreeable to our moral intuition? There are plenty of cases to suggest that the answer is in the affirmative. Do we not daily put up with trifling inconveniences and burdens in order to accommodate eccentrics, cranks, petty tyrants, overbearing people, compulsive bureaucrats, and so on? And is this not because we find the cost of changing the situation too great as compared with the inconvenience of putting up with it, whereas the persons thus tolerated would apparently be quite unhappy or even miserable if we did not?

To wind all this up, then, let us put both sets of criticisms in perspective by making a distinction between petty fanatics and grand fanatics. Accepting Gettner’s point that Hare’s treatment was really only intended to condemn grand fanatics, I have pointed out that in its utilitarian format, it can also handle petty ones. It handles them, as Gettner agrees it should, by sometimes allowing them. Grand fanatics, on the other hand, are handled only by showing that it is utterly absurd to suppose that they are really promoting the utility of all when they torture, murder, incarcerate, and generally make things miserable for their victims. It does not show that grand fanatics are logically inconsistent on top of it, though no doubt many of them are. And I have pointed out that sheer practical inconsistency, as opposed to what may be called “moral inconsistency,” is not obviously an available charge against all immoral acts and principles at any level, perhaps contrary to what Hare may at one time have thought. On the whole, therefore, I think that Hare’s view is reasonably well sustained, at least against the range of important criticisms mounted in these two articles.